In 1953 David Gale noticed that for every n-person game in extensive form with perfect information modeled by an arborescence (a rooted tree) some special Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be found by an algorithm of successive elimination of leaves, which is now called the backward induction. (The result can be easily extended from the trees to the acyclic directed graphs.) He also noticed the same procedure, performed for the normal form of this game, turns into successive elimination of dominated strategies of the players that results in a single strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn), which is called a domination equilibrium (DE) and appears to be a Nash-equilibrium (NE) too. In other words, the game in normal form obtained from a positional game with perfect information is dominance-solvable (DS) and also Nash-solvable (NS). Yet, an arbitrary game in normal form may be not DS. We strengthen Gale's results as follows. Consider several successive eliminations of dominated strategies that begins with X = X1 × . . . × Xn and ends in X = X 1 × . . . × X n . We will call X a D-box of X. Our main (although obvious) lemma claims that for any i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} and for any strategy xi ∈ Xi its "projection" to a D-box X of X is dominated by a strategy x i ∈ X i . It immediately follows that any DE is an NE and, hence, DS implies NS. It is enough to apply the lemma in the case when X consists of a single strategy profile. Also this lemma implies that, in general, the domination procedure is well-defined in the following sense. A D-box X of X is called terminal if it is domination-free, that is, it contains no pair of strategies such that one of them is dominated by the other. Any two terminal D-boxes X and X of X are equal. More precisely, there exist n permutations π = (π1, . . . , πn), with πi : Xi → Xi for i ∈ I, that transform X into X , that is, π(X ) = X and the payoffs are respected. We also recall some published results on dominance-solvable game forms.
We would also like it to be anti-symmetric: x i x i and x i x i implies x i x i . The reason is clear. We plan to eliminate the dominated strategy x i from X i , since it cannot be better than x i . Yet, it may happen that u(i, x) = u(i, x ), for all x, x considered above, while u(j, x) = u(j, x ) for some x, x and j ∈ I. In other words, the strategies x i and x i are equally good for i in all cases, so we could eliminate any of them and i will be indifferent. Yet, the difference between x i and x i may be very important for other players. Thus, without anti-symmetry of domination no uniqueness will hold. To resolve this issue, let us simply require for all x, x ∈ X that u(i, x) = u(i, x ) for all i ∈ I whenever u(i , x) = u(i , x ) for some i ∈ I, if x and x are equally good for a player then they are equally good for all players, or in other words, represent the same outcome of the game.
Thus, we naturally come to the concepts of a game form, defined as a mapping g : X → A, where A = {a 1 , . . . , a p } is a set of outcomes of the game. Naturally, we assume that two distinct outcomes a, a ∈ A cannot be equally good for all player, since otherwise, why are they distinct. Hence, they cannot be equally good for any player, that is, u(i, a) = u(i, a ) for some i ∈ I implies that a = a .
Then, u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) is a preference profile rather than a real valued utility function: u i is a complete order over A reflecting the preference of player i ∈ I. Now, the pair (g, u) defines a game in normal form; two strategies x i and x i are equivalent, if g(x) = g(x ) is the same outcome from A for x, x ∈ X considered above, and domination becomes anti-symmetric:
x i x i and x i x i imply that x i x i .
Main lemma
Given X = X 1 × . . . × X n and Y = Y 1 × . . . × Y n we will call Y a box of X and write Y ⊆ X if Y i ⊆ X i for all i ∈ I. Given a game form g : X → A, a game (g, u), and two strategies x i , x i ∈ X i , we say that x i dominates x i modulo Y and write x i x i mod Y if u(i, x) ≥ u(i, x ) for every x and x such that x j = x j ∈ Y j for all j ∈ I \ {i}. To visualize, we can say that projection of x i into Y dominates projection of x i into Y . Obviously, domination respects projection: if
x i x i mod X and Y ⊆ X then x i x i mod Y We will need several definitions related to boxes:
• A box Y ⊆ X is domination-free if for any i ∈ I it contains no two strategies x i , x i ∈ Y i such that x i x i mod Y .
• We will successively eliminate dominated strategies of (different) players i ∈ I, one by one, in some order. Any box Y ⊆ X obtained in several such steps is called a D-box.
• A domination-free D-box will be called terminal.
• A terminal D-box that consists of a unique strategy profile will be called a domination equilibrium (DE).
Note that on each step, the set of dominated strategies of a player may depend on which strategy of another player was eliminated on the previous steps, if these two players are distinct. Hence, the procedure is not unique, it branches. Yet, making use of the following simple claim, we will prove, in Section 1.3 that, in a sense, the resulting domination-free D-box is well-defined.
Lemma 1 For a D-box Y ⊆ X and a strategy x i ∈ X i , there exists a strategy y i ∈ Y i such that y i x i mod Y .
Proof. If x i ∈ Y i then x i x i and there is nothing to prove. If x i ∈ Y i then at some step it was dominated by a strategy x i ∈ X i . If x i ∈ Y i then just set y i = x i and we are done. If x i ∈ Y i then at some step it was dominated by a strategy x i ∈ X i , etc. Sooner or later we will obtain some x ... ∈ Y i . Since domination is transitive and it respects projection, our claim follows. .
From the definition of NE and Lemma 1 we immediately derive the next statement.
Proposition 1 Any domination equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
All terminal D-boxes are equal
Given a game (g, u) in normal form. As we mentioned, typically, one can eliminate dominated strategies of the players in many different orders, thus, getting different terminal D-boxes. Yet, in the following sense, they are all equal.
Theorem 1 For any two terminal D-boxes Y, Z ⊆ X there exist a profile of n permutations π = (π i :
In particular, Theorem 1 implies that all terminal D-boxes are of the same size and in case it is 1×. . .×1, all corresponding DE realize the same outcome.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider any two sequences of eliminating dominated strategies in X, one by one, that result in Y and Z. There is a unique step of the second sequence when a strategy x i ∈ Y i is eliminated first time, by a strategy x i . The equality holds, because Y is a terminal D-box, while the equivalence holds, because domination is anti-symmetric. And ... here we can stop. Indeed, whenever we eliminate a strategy from Y an equivalent, mod Y , strategy of the same player is left in the current box. Replace x i = x i by x i and proceed. At the end, when we reach Z, a required permutation profile, which transfers Y to Z will be obtained.
2 Dominance-solvable (and Nash-solvable) game forms
Backward induction in extensive and normal form
The backward induction (BI) algorithm was developed for n-person games with perfect information in extensive (positional) form, modeled by an arborescence (that is, by a rooted tree)) by Gale [9] and Kuhn [25] ; see also [24, Theorem 1] .
For positional games BI works as follows. Take a position v every move from which enters a terminal; chose a move (v, v ) maximazing the payoff of the player i ∈ I that controls v; assign to v the whole payoff vector in v , make v a new terminal, and eliminate all terminals succeeding v. We already mentioned the problem caused by possible ties and explained how to resolve it. Repeat the above procedure until the root v 0 becomes the terminal. Thus, we obtain the resulting payoff vector, and also the strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), which is a DE.
"It is somewhat surprising, then, that the same solution could have been obtained by examining only the normal form of the game" [9] . Yet, maximizing the payoff of the player i ∈ I that controls v over all terminals a ∈ A that succeed v, we do in fact the following: In the extensive form, we fix a move (v, a) maximizing u i , assign the whole payoff profile in a to v, and then, eliminate all moves (v, a) making v a new terminal. In the normal form, we select a strategy x i that maximizes the payoff of i in v making a move (v, a) and some moves in the remaining positions and a strategy x i that makes the same moves in the remaining positions and some other move (v, a ) in v. Obviously, x i dominates x i . We consider all such comparable pairs, one by one (typically, there are very many of them) and each time we eliminate the dominated strategy.
Remark 1 For each such pair x i , x i either g(x) = g(x ) or g(x) = a and g(x ) = a , where a and a are introduced in the previous paragraph, while for x and x see the definition of domination. In other words, the strategies x i and x i differ only in outcomes a and a , while all other corresponding outcomes coincide.
A game form g : X → A is called positional if it is generated by an extensive n-person game structure with perfect information modeled by rooted tree. The previous results immediately imply the next statement.
Proposition 2 Positional game forms are dominance-solvable.
Several examples of positional game forms together with the corresponding positional structures can be found in [19] and [1] . For reader's convenience we reproduce some positional game forms here.
The first three are two-person game forms, while the last one is a three-person game form.
Characterizing positional game forms
Their characterization was given in [15, Chapter 5] and [16] ; see also [17] , [19] , and [1] for more details. Here we just summarize briefly the results.
Let g : X = i∈I X i → A be an n-person game form. Standardly, I and A denote respectively the sets of the players (voters) and the outcomes (candidates) in the game (voting) theory. We assume that mapping g is surjective, g(X) = A, but typically it is not injective, in other words, different strategy profiles may determine the same outcome. The subsets K ⊆ I and B ⊆ A are called coalitions and blocks, respectively. A strategy x K = (x i | i ∈ K) of a coalition K is defined as a collection of strategies, one for each coalitionist of K. A pair of strategies x K of coalition K and x I\K of the complementary coalition I \ K uniquely defines a strategy profile x = (x K , x I\K ).
We say that a non-empty coalition K is effective for a block B if this coalition has a strategy such that the resulting outcome is in B for any strategies of the opponents; in other words, if there is a strategy x K such that for any strategy x I\K for the obtained strategy profile x = (x K , x I\K we have g(x) ∈ B. We write E(K, B) = 1 if K is effective for B and E(K, B) = 0 otherwise.
Since g is surjective, by the above definition, we have E g (I, B) = 0 if and only B = ∅. The value E g (K, B)
was not yet defined for K = ∅. By convention, we set E g (∅, B) = 1 if and only if B = A.
The obtained function E g : 2
is called the effectivity function (of the game form g). By definition, E g is a Boolean function whose set of variables is the union I ∪ A of all players and outcomes.
Note that equalities E g (K, B) = 1 and E g (I \ K, A \ B) = 1 cannot hold simultaneously. Indeed, otherwise there would exist strategies x K , x I\K and blocks B, A \ B such that g(x) ∈ B ∩ (A \ B) = ∅, that is, g is not defined on the strategy profile x = (x K , x I\K ). Note that cases K = ∅ and K = I are covered by the above convention. Thus, we have
A game form g is called tight if the inverse implication holds too: 
; in other words, mapping g : X → A assigns a box in X to each outcomes a ∈ A. g is positional, g is tight and rectangular, g is weakly tight and rectangular.
The result was announced in [14, Remark 3] ; see also [16] , [19] , [21] and [1] ). We leave to the reader verify these three properties for the four game forms given above.
2.3 Tight, totally tight, Nash-solvable, and acyclic game forms for n = 2 and n > 2
For the two-person game forms, n = 2, the following chain of important implications was shown in [6] . Moreover, it was also shown that no other implication may hold between these five properties.
• Acyclicity (AC) means the absence of improvement cycles for any u.
• Total tightness (TT) means that every 2 × 2 box contains a constant (that is, containing only one outcome) line.
We refer the reader to [6] and [3] for more details and, in particular, for extending the concept of TT for n > 2. The last three properties were already defined above for arbitrary n.
Tightness and NS are equivalent for the two-person game forms. This result was obtained in [14] and repeated in a more focused paper [18] ; see also [15, Chapter 2] and much more recent [28] , [20] , [23] .
Yet, already for n = 3 tightness is not necessary and not sufficient for NS; see examples in [14, Remark 3] and [18] . Implication TT ⇒ NS was shown in [3] for n = 3 and it is an open problem whether it holds for n > 3. The following three implications hold for all n:
• DS ⇒ T, [27] ;
• TT ⇒ T, [6] , by the definitions, it is enough to verify for n = 2;
• AC ⇒ NS is immediate from the definitions;
• DS ⇒ NS, immediately follows from Proposition 1.
The example in [3, Figure 1 in Section 5] disproves two implications: TT ⇒ AC and TT ⇒ DS. Thus, total tightness becomes much weaker when n > 2. The following simple example from [18] shows the same for acyclicity.
It is not difficult to verify that for the above game form AC and, hence, NS hold, while DS, T, and hence, TT do not. [14, Remark 3] that NS ⇒ T. This mistake was noticed by Danilov.
Remark 2 It was claimed in
Thus, we get an almost complete analysis of the implications between the above five classes of game forms. Only TT ⇒ N S remains open for n > 3.
Dominance-solvable game forms in veto-voting
Here we present briefly the main results of [11] following the notation of the textbook [27, Chapter 6] .
In the voting theory, we interpret I = {1, . . . , n} as voters and A = {a 1 , . . . , a p } as candidates. To each i ∈ I we assign a positive integer µ i , interpret it as his veto-power, and give him µ i veto-cards. Respectively, with every a ∈ A we associate a positive integer λ a that will mean her veto-resistance. We always assume that i∈I µ i < a∈A λ a .
A strategy x i of a voter i ∈ I is an arbitrary distribution of his veto-cards among the candidates a ∈ A such that each one gets at most her veto-resistance, µ i (a) ≤ λ a . Given a strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) we define µ(a) = i∈I µ i (a). All candidates a ∈ A with µ(a) ≥ λ a are vetoed, and all others, A(x) ⊆ A with µ(a) < λ a , are elected. Obviously, at least one candidate is elected, A(x) = ∅, but maybe, more. Let µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) and λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ p ) denote veto-power and vetoresistance profiles, respectively. The mapping C = C µ,λ : X → 2
A defined by C(x) = A(x) is a veto game correspondence. Selecting an arbitrary candidate a ∈ A(x) for every x ∈ X we obtain a veto game form g ∈ C µ,λ .
Proposition 3 A veto game form g ∈ C µ,λ is tight whenever a∈A λ a − i∈I µ i = 1.
The proof can be found in [27, Chapter 6] . The result may be easily reformulated in terms if the so-called threshold Boolean functions [8, Part II Chapter 9] .
The DS veto game forms are sparse, however, there are infinitely many of them [11] .
Each voter has three strategies: to veto a 1 , a 2 , or a 3 . Hence, C = C (1,1),(1,1,1) is a 3 × 3 veto game correspondence. There are 2 3 = 8 veto game forms g ∈ C, since we have to choose one of the two elected candidates on the main diagonal, while in each of the remaining six strategy profiles the elected candidate is unique. We obtain a DS veto game form only when we select three pairwise distinct candidates on the main diagonal. There are only two such choices, they are given above. It is not difficult to verify that both veto game forms are DS.
Remark 3 Let us note that every two strategies of the voter 1 or 2 differ by two outcomes and recall Remark 1. Thus, DS veto game forms are very different from the positional ones.
Example 2. There are two voters of veto-power 1 and 2 and four candidates of veto-resistance 1 each, that is, n = 2, µ = (1, 2) and p = 4, λ = (1, 1, 1, 1 
In this case C = C (1,2),(1,1,1,1) is a 4 × 6 veto game correspondence. There are 2 10 = 1024 veto game forms g ∈ C and only four of them are DS [11] ; both are given above.
Example 3. There are two voters of veto-power 2 each and five candidates of veto-resistance 1 each, that is, n = 2, µ = (2, 2) and p = 4, λ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). a 4 a 3 a 3 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1  a 5 a 5 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2   a 4 a 5 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 3  a 3 a 5 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 4 a 4  a 3 a 4 a 1 a 1 a 5 a 1 a 5 a 5 a 2 a 5 a 5 a 5  a 2 a 5 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 3  a 2 a 4 a 1 a 1 a 5 a 3 a 5 a 5 a 3 a 5 a 5 a 3  a 2 a 3 a 1 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 4   a 1 a 5 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 3  a 1 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 5 a 3 a 5 a 5 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 3  a 1 a 3 a 2 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 5 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 4 a 4  a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 a 5 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 3 In this case C = C (2,2),(1,1,1,1,1) is a 10 × 10 veto game correspondence. One of its DS veto game forms is given above. A social choice function (SCF) is a special game form g : X → A, where A = {a 1 , . . . , a p }, I = {1, . . . , n}; X = i∈I X i = X 1 × . . . × X n ; furthermore X 1 = . . . = X n is the set of all linear orders over A. In other words, each voter i ∈ I, as a strategy x i ∈ X i , reveals his/her preference over the set of candidates A = {a 1 , . . . , a p }, and the elected candidate a ∈ A is a function a = g(x) of the obtained preference profile
An SCF is called sincere (or manipulation-free, or strategy-proof) if every strategy profile x ∈ X is a NE with respect to the same preference profile x. This is an attractive property, since if it holds, the voters need no manipulations, since no voter i ∈ I can make a profit revealing a preference x i distinct from his/her actual preference x i .
Notice that in the above definitions x ∈ X is viewed simultaneously as a strategy and preference profile.
An SCF is called dictatorial if there is a voter i 0 ∈ I such that in every situation x ∈ X the best candidate for i 0 is chosen. Obviously, the dictator is unique and any such a SCF is sincere. Indeed, the dictator can only lose by manipulating, while for any other voter it is just useless, because his/her preference does not matter anyway.
Given an SCF S with n voters and only two candidates, p = 2, and a profile x, let I = K 1 (x) ∩ K 2 (x) denote the partition of the voters into two coalitions K 1 = K 1 (x) and K 2 = K 2 (x), which prefer candidate a 1 to a 2 and, respectively, vice versa. Then, S is called monotone if for j = 1, 2 we have:
. In other words, a candidate remain elected whenever the supporting coalition is getting larger. Clearly, such SCFs are sincere, too.
By the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [10, 29] , there are no others. This statement is similar and closely related to the the well-known paradox Arrow in the voting theory; see [27, Chapters 4.4 and 3.6] for more details.
Due to this "negative" result, it seems natural to relax the property of sincerity. We will apply the concept of DS. If an SCF S is DS then a DE is defined for each x ∈ X. Thus, we obtain another SCF S = D(S). Somewhat surprisingly, D(S) frequently (although not always) appears in its turn to be DS itself, and so we can consider the sequence S, D(S), D 2 (S), . . . etc., getting domination cycles. All such cycles are found in case n = p = 3 [12] ; see [13] for more details.
An SCF S is called stable if D(S) = S. A stable SCF is not sincere (unless it is dictatorial or monotone with p = 2) and yet, for every x ∈ X the game (S, x) in the normal form is DS and, moreover, its DE outcome (D(S))(x) = S (x) is equal to S(x); see the epigraph above.
Let us recall an example with n = p = 3 from [12] . Voters 1 and 2 are leaders, together they have full power and may elect any one of the three candidates. If they agree upon the best candidate then (s)he is elected, and if the worst candidates in their preference lists are distinct then the remaining one is elected. Under these two rules, only six conflict situations remain unresolved: both voters, 1 and 2, hate most the same candidate but like most distinct two. In this case they ask the voter 3 (who represents people): "who among the first two candidates do you prefer?" listen to the answer and choose ... oppositely. The obtained SCF S is stable, although, obviously, unfair (and one can even say "mocking") with respect to people, represented by voter 3. Note that if the two leaders would choose in accordance with the people's will then the obtained SCF S won't be stable; see more details in [12, 13] . In Figures 1-6 we use the following notation. Configurations are represented by planar grids whose nodes correspond to the strategy profiles (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 . A line with two dashes between two nodes means that the corresponding two situations make a tie, while an arrow from one node to another means that the second situation is better than the first one, for the player choosing among them. The corresponding games are represented by tables whose rows and columns are the strategies X 1 and X 2 , respectively. Thus, strategy profiles (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 are represented by the cells of these tables, where u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and u 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) are located respectively in the bottom-left and top-right corners of the cell (x 1 , x 2 ).
2.6 Criteria of Nash-and dominance-solvability based on excluding 2 × 2-subconfigurations
Recognition of math-patters
In 1964 Shapley [30] observed that a matrix has a saddle point (SP) whenever every its 2 × 2 submatrix has one. In other words, the real 2 × 2 matrices in which both entries of one diagonal is strictly larger than both entries of the other are the only minimal SP-free matrices. This result was strengthen in [5] , where it was demonstrated that these matrices are not just the only minimal, but also the only locally minimal SP-free matrices. In other words, every SP-free matrix of size larger than 2 × 2 has a row or a column that can be deleted and the reduced matrix still remains SP-free.
This property can be extended to the two-person non-zero-sum case, but in a more sophisticated way. A locally minimal NE-free bimatrix games were fully characterized in [5] ; see also [2, Theorem 1 in Section 1.2]. Such a bimatrix is square, but may be of any size n × n, with n ≥ 2, and is representable as the direct sum of strong improvement cycles; see [5] for the definitions and more details.
Furthermore, Shapley's [30] statement can be generalized to bimatrix games in many other ways as follows. Recall that, in general, NE, DE, and the concept of domination itself depend on the pre-orders of the players rather than on the real values of the utility function. So, let us partition all 2 × 2 bimatrix games into fifteen classes S = {c 1 , . . . , c 15 } depending on the preference pre-orders of the two players.
A subset t ⊆ S is called a DE-theorem if a bimatrix game has a DE, whenever it contains no 2 × 2 subgame from t. A subset e ⊆ S is called a DE-example if a bimatrix game has no DE, while all its 2 × 2 subgames are from e. It is not difficult to show that two set-families T DE and E DE of all minimal (that is, the strongest) DE-theorems and DE-examples are dual (sometimes called also transversal). This property provides an efficient stopping criterion: we extend the considered two lists verifying each time the duality condition which will certify that both lists are complete and cannot be extended further. By this method we obtain all DE-theorems and all DE-examples. One can replace DE by NE, the method remains the same.
Actually, this method, which can be called the recognition of math-patterns, is even much more general. One can consider any set of attributes (properties) S trying to characterize any target subset P 0 within an arbitrary set of objects P . In [22] , this approach was illustrated by a simple model problem in which P is the set of all 4-gons on the plane, P 0 is the subset of squares, and S is a set of eight properties of a quadrilateral. Two dual hypergraphs of all minimal theorems T SQ and examples E SQ were constructed. In [7] , this approach was applied to a more serious problem related to some special families of the Berge graphs. Recently, the method was analyzed in [2] to several concepts of game theory. Here we will recall two cases, related to NE and DE for bimatrix games. So from now on we restrict ourselves to the case of two players, n = 2.
Configurations, alphabet, fifteen 2-squares
To decide whether a strategy profile x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 = X is a NE or whether x i x i for i ∈ {1, 2}, One does not need to know the payoff function u : X → R 2 . It is enough to know pre-orders: for any x i , x i ∈ X i and x 3−i ∈ X 3−i whether i prefers (x i , x 3−i ) to (x i , x 3−i ), or vice versa, or (s)he is indifferent and these two strategy profiles make a tie.
A product X = X 1 × X 2 with all preference pre-orders of both players will be called a configuration; restricted to a box X 1 × X 2 , where X i ⊆ X i for i = 1, 2, it will be called a subconfiguration. For brevity, a subconfiguration of size 2 × 2, that is, when |X 1 | = |X 2 | = 2, is called a 2-square. We will not distinguish 2-squares one of which can be obtained from the other by Shapley's theorem asserts that every c 1 -free zero-sum game (or configuration) has a saddle point. Thus, it outlines a hereditary class of NS zero-sum games. In this section we obtain similar conditions for NS and DS, in terms of some subsets of forbidden 2-squares from S = {c 1 , . . . , c 15 }. Obviously, any class of games (more generally, objects) defined by a family of forbidden subgames (respectively, subobjects) is hereditary. In contrast, the families of the (zero-sum) NS or DS games are not. Hence, Shapley's and all other conditions announced above are only sufficient but not necessary. They define some hereditary subclasses of NS and DS games.
NE-examples, NE-conjectures, and NE-theorems
Our goal is to find and prove all strongest NE-theorems, which are assigned to all inclusion-minimal subsets t ⊆ S = {c 1 , . . . , c 15 } such that any t-free configuration contains an NE. To this end, we start to collect the strongest NE-examples, that is, all inclusion-minimal subsets e ⊆ S such that there exists an NE-free configuration containing only 2-squares from e. The simplest such configuration is the 2-square c 1 alone; e = (c 1 ). Four others are shown in Figure 2 . Thus, we obtain a family of NE-examples {(c 1 ), (c 2 , c 3 ), (c 3 , c 5 , c 6 ), (c 5 , c 9 ), (c 2 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 )}. It is convenient to write it as a disjunctive normal form (DNF)
Remark 4 As we already mentioned in the beginning of Section 2.6, a locally minimal NE-free bimatrix games (and configurations, as well) were fully characterized in [5] . They may be of any size n × n, with n ≥ 2, and representable as direct sums of strong improvement cycles; see [5] for the definition more details. This result simplifies constructing NE-examples a lot. Obviously, each NE-example is a locally minimal NE-free configuration and, hence, it must contain a strong improvement cycles; c 1 is such a cycle itself. Each configuration in Figure 2 is a square of size n × n, for some n ≥ 2, containing a strong improvement cycle C n . The corresponding 2n entries are denoted by n white and n black small disks such that a white disk is a unique maximum in its row for the column player, while a black disk is a unique maximum in its column for the row player.
It is clear that every NE-theorem t ∈ T N E and NE-example e ∈ E N E must intersect. Indeed, if e ∩ t = ∅ then e is a counterexample to t and, hence, it is not a theorem. Moreover, our research is complete whenever E N E and T N E form a pair of dual hypergraphs, since in this case, by the definition of duality, any new example or theorem would be weaker than one that already exists. (This is true not only for NE, but for any target property P 0 ⊆ P and for any alphabet S of arbitrary attributes.) Dualizing DNF E N E we obtain In [2] all six theorems were proven. Thus, T N E = E d N E and our NE-research is complete, in terms of the set of properties S = {c 1 , . . . , c 15 }. Of course, S can be modified. For example, it is not mandatory to identify the transposed 2-squares, we can view them as distinct. Doing so, we expand the set of attributes and change the families of NE-examples and NE-theorems; although they will remain dual.
Let us underline that some examples may be missing in E and, then, some theorems may be missing in E d ; moreover, some "theorems" from E d may be just wrong. Suppose that we failed to construct the example e = (c 2 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 ) ∈ E N E , which is possible, since the corresponding 4 × 4 configuration is not that simple. Then dualizing the "incomplete" DNF E N E = c 1 ∨ c 2 c 3 ∨ c 3 c 5 c 6 ∨ c 5 c 9 , we obtain Instead of three ugly theorems c 1 c 2 c 3 c 9 ∨ c 1 c 3 c 4 c 9 ∨ c 1 c 3 c 6 c 9 , we have one nice conjecture c 1 c 3 c 9 , which has only one disadvantage: it is an overstatement. If we fail proving it after sufficiently hard work and long time, we will have to return to our list of examples and verify it. Perhaps, we can strengthen some of them or add one (as in the considered case) or several missing examples. If we cannot do this, we return to the list of theorems again, etc. The result is not guaranteed, as subsection 2.6.5 shows.
DE-examples, DE-conjectures, and DE-theorems
Let us note that c 1 must be a DE-example, because it is a NE-free 2-square. Furthermore, c 2 is a DE-example too, although it has a NE. Except these two, we got five larger DE-examples: (c 3 , c 5 , c 6 ) from Figure 2 and four shown in Figures 3-6 .
Remark 5 Note that (c 2 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 ) is a DE-example too, since it is an NE-example, see Figure 2 , but it is not minimal, since (c 4 , c 5 , c 6 ) is a stronger DE-example; see Figure 6 . Yet, the latter has a NE.
Thus, we obtain the DNF E DE = c 1 ∨c 2 ∨c 3 c 5 c 6 ∨c 4 c 5 c 6 ∨c 5 c 9 ∨c 5 c 10 ∨c 6 c 11 . Dualizing it, we get the list of DE-conjectures, which all can be proven. Thus, E Note that the last two DE-theorems, (c 1 , c 2 , c 5 , c 11 ) and (c 1 , c 2 , c 6 , c 9 , c 10 ), are equivalent, since one is obtained from the other by changing the pre-order of a player (one from two) to the inverse one. Obviously, this operation keeps all domination free subgames and transforms one of the above two DE-theorems into the other.
Even more important is to notice that in this subsection we waved the assumption u 1 (x) = u 1 (x ) ⇔ u 2 (x) = u 2 (x ) and, as we know, without this assumption the concept of domination is not well-defined, although formally all above results are correct. For this reason, in the next subsection we modify the NE-and DE-research adapting it for the game forms rather than the games in normal form. 3) is an NE 2.6.5 Tie-transitive (or formal) Nash-and dominance-solvability A configuration is called tie-transitive (TT) or formal if it can be realized by a game form. One can easily verify in linear time whether a given configuration is TT. The transitive closure of all ties (equalities) of both players uniquely defines a game form. Extend the pre-order of the player i = 1, 2 to the outcomes of this game form. The configuration is TT if and only if no cycle appears, neither for player 1 nor for 2.
For example, among fifteen 2-squares on Figure 1 , all are TT, except for c 13 and c 14 . It is also not difficult to verify that the first two configurations on Figure 2 are TT, while the last two are not. Thus, in the TT case we keep NE-examples E
